Peace deals signed by Pakistan with Terrorists in FATA
October 15, 2012
Sourced from Syed Saleem Shahzad’s book Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11.
Srarogha peace deal in February 2005.
It was a six-clause, written agreement which included:
• Baitullah and his group would neither harbor nor support any
foreign fighter in his area.
• Baitullah and his supporters would not attack any government
functionary or damage government property. Also, they would
not cause any hindrance to development activities.
• The government would not take action against Baitullah and his
supporters for their past acts. However, if found to be involved
in any kind of terrorist or criminal activities in the future, they
would be dealt with according to the prevailing laws in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). If any culprit were found
present in the Mehsud area, he would be handed over to the
The agreement read:
• We pledge that if any culprit (not from the Baitullah group) is
found in this area, the Mehsud tribe will hand him over to the
government and the government is empowered to take action
under FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulations). 1
• All those issues not covered under this agreement will be resolved
through mutual consultation between the political administration
and the Malısud tribe.
• In case of violation of any of the above ciauses, the political
administration is empowered to take a legal course of action.
The agreement was signed by Baitullah Mehsud and members of the
jirga (Malik Inayatullah Khan, Malik Qayum Sher, and Malik Sher
A few comments on this agreement:
• No ciause was inserted in the agreement regarding cross-border
infihration or attacks in Afghanistan.
• There was no ciause that foreign fighters would be surrendered.
• There was no ciause requiring the militants to lay down arms.
• Controversies arose over reports of money payments to the
militants during peace negotiations.
• Abdullah Mehsud, the second most İnıportant commander, opted
out of the agreement.
Ahmed Rashid comments on these peace deals from his book “Descent into Chaos”:
Despite their losses, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their allies emerged as victors, which Pakistan’s army acknowledged when it signed an agreement with the militants at Shakai on April 24, 2004, pardoning their leaders and giving foreign militants a week to register with the authorities. The very idea that al Qaeda would “register” with the political agent was clearly ridiculous, and the agreement quickly broke down. The army went on the offensive again, blockading Wana and stopping all goods from entering South Waziristan. Nek Mohammed was killed by a U.S. missile strike on June 18, after a U.S. surveillance drone locked onto his satellite phone. Thousands of tribesmen turned out for his funeral.
On September 5, 2006, Orakzai signed an agreement with seven Pakistani Taliban leaders in North Waziristan—although the government insisted that the agreement was signed with tribal elders and not the Taliban. The agreement, which was to become immensely controversial in Kabul and Washington, stipulated that all Taliban attacks on U.S. and Afghan forces in Afghanistan and on the Pakistan army would cease. In return the army would pull out its garrisons and checkpoints, release all prisoners, return captured equipment and vehicles, and compensate those tribesmen who had suffered losses. The army quickly fulfilled its side of the bargain, thereby legitimizing Taliban control of North Waziristan. The agreement turned into a capitulation by the army because there was no mechanism for its enforcement. The Pakistanis had no means to challenge or punish the Taliban if they continued their attacks across the border—which they did. Thus, while the Taliban stopped attacking Pakistani troops, they stepped up their attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which immediately aroused suspicions in Kabul that this was Islamabad’s intention all along.