America’s Jihad and “Counter-jihad” in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Joanne Herring (Political Activist played a central role in Afghan American jihad 1980) with Sharia fanatic Zia ul Haq

ZIA ul Haq with Jimmy Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

September 11, 2001. Secret Service agent informing George Bush of Trade Centre Attack. Counter Jihad Begins

CIA-USAID-University of Nebraska destroyed Pak-Afghan social fabric…: What happened, in-between 1979-1989, to socio-political fabric of Afghanistan and Pakistan, is a story of shame and pain; the response to the Soviet Union in the 1980s was not confined to the tactical guerilla warfare field only; a massive anti-Russia propaganda campaign was accompanied by efforts to instill the “spirit of jihad” into the hearts and minds of Afghan children and teenagers alike. Millions of dollars and riyals (Saudi Arabian currency) were spent on the “jihadisation” of the Afghan primary and middle school curricula. Then, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) commissioned the Center for Afghanistan Studies (CAS), University of Nebraska, Omaha, to review the Afghan curricula and mould it in line with the anti-Russian policy objectives of the US-led jihad. Under a $43 million USAID-financed project, around 4-dozen University of Nebraska faculty and staff members worked overtime to produce more than 15 million textbooks in Pashto and Dari (two primary languages in Afghanistan) for distribution among children, largely living in the refugee camps set up in Pakistan – and partially in Iran. Along with a chain of jihadi madrasahs in the Pak-Afghan border regions, the CIA contrived – with the active support from the ISI- to harvest a militarized civil society that would furnish physical sustenance in addition to providing ideological support to jihadis raised at madrasahs…..

CIA-USAID-University of Nebraska tried to rebuild: Later on, immediately after the Bonn conference in December 2001, members of the coalition against terrorism agreed on a transitional Afghan government, led by Hamid Karzai. With this a new massive socio-economic effort also got underway to help Afghanistan. Reviewing the curricula also constituted the broad list of initiatives meant for “fixing” the Afghan problem. Once again, the USAID sprung into action and commissioned the University of Nebraska, Omaha to undertake a review of the primary textbooks on a war-footing. The review began immediately with the stated objective of “removing objectionable content” that “promoted violence, hatred and war” from the Afghan curriculum in February 2002.” In an interview with the CRSS (Nov 2009), a USAID official said that “in February 2002 we removed all references to violence, and changed the alphabet chart which had references to weaponry, for example: T is for Tank, R is for Rocket, K for Kalashnikov, M for Mujahid, J for jihad.” “We also removed any messaging that promoted bad feelings towards minorities, etc. However, a complete curriculum overhaul was not done at that time,” the official explained, saying the work was done on an emergency basis since the deadline for delivering 10.5 million textbooks all over Afghanistan was middle of March, 2002, to coincide with Afghanistan’s New Year and the beginning of the new academic year in the third week of that month. USAID funded this project with $6.5 million, practically cleansing the books of materials it had funded in the early 1980s to be included in the textbooks. This “intellectual subversion” found its way into the Pakistani text books as well and played their bit in converting generations of Pakistani students into extremists that manifest in the form of religio-social violence that the Pakistani society is experiencing now.

American war against USSR victimized Pakistani and Afghan people: In a quick CRSS field trip to Kacha Garhi refugee camp, our team met with an elderly Afghan teacher at the local school surrounded by Pashto and Dari textbooks. A USAID hang-out inside the camp he scribbled on a big register and shared: “we are now removing what we had inserted into these books 20 years ago.” His response solidified the idea as to how the CIA-USAID-UoN systematically intervened in Afghanistan and converted it into a “jihadisation” against the “Evil Empire” or “Godless Infidels,” as the terminology was used in those days. This effort practically destroyed the societies both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is a hitherto the least explored dimension of the US-led Jihad’s degeneration into militant Islam and terrorism. It is a sad story of Pakistan’s decline from a front-line citadel of Islamist US-led Jihad against “infidels” to an embattled State, facing the consequences of that jihad.

…And now US singly blames Pakistan: Unfortunately, this instrumentalization of proxies – countries, groups or individuals – for foreign policy objectives is nothing new. “The United state spent decades cultivating Islamists, manipulating and double crossing them, cynically using and misusing them as Cold War allies, only to find that it spawned a force that turned against its sponsor, and with a vengeance. Like monsters imbued with artificial life, radical imams, mullahs, and ayatollahs stalk the landscape, thundering not only against the United States but against freedom of thought, against secular science, against nationalism and the left, against women’s rights. Some are terrorists, but far more are medieval-minded religious fanatics who want to turn the calendar back to seventh century,” Robert Dreyfuss writes in the introduction of his book “Devil’s Game,” that illustrates what he calls “over six decades of America’s empire-building project in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan”. Strangely, over three decades of failures of Pakistan’s military and political elite notwithstanding, the United States stands out as the single source of:

1. putting Pakistan on the way to jihad for its own narrow-ended foreign policy objectives in the early 1980s; and
2. using Pakistan again in the post 9/11 response to fight the forces that had grown from the womb of the CIA-ISI sponsored anti-Soviet Russian jihad.

America’s rediscovery of a lost friend: Soon after the Soviet forces entered Afghanistan in December 1979, the United States responded with money and military hardware for several Afghan opposition leaders – who were to become the blued-eyed boys of Washington. Pakistan, through its Inter-Services’ Intelligence (ISI) played as the local facilitator for what became universally known as jihad. The CIA-ISI led “jihad” ran through until February 1989, when the then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, saw the last of his troops walk out of Afghanistan after a decade of humiliation. From then onward, the United States disengaged from Pakistan, and in October, the same year, President George Bush (senior) slapped sanctions on Islamabad for possessing nuclear devices. Throughout the 1990s, Washington kept Pakistan at a distance only to rediscover “a lost friend” after September 11 attacks and demanded from Pakistan to actually forget the way it was diplomatically handled for a little over a decade. The United States turned to Pakistan again for help and lifted the sanctions when terrorists brought down the symbol of American might – the twin towers of the World Trade Center, New York on 9/11, 2001.

America had a flawed policy on Afghanistan: In December 2009, CRSS interviewed a senior European diplomat of a small but important EU member State. The Ambassador shared a story from two decades ago about a fascinating tale meeting that he attended as a junior officer with State Department officials in Washington in October 1988. Afghanistan was one of the subjects under discussion between the two delegations. Once they touched on the issue of the Afghan resistance – the seven mujahideen commanders – the head of delegation from this small but important European country asked curiously about the possible impact of the western support for religious fundamentalist groups. “Don’t worry, they are Sunnis and not Shia fundamentalists, they are our allies,” was the response the European delegation got from the State Department counterparts who were then dealing with South and Southwest Asia.

Pakistan’s mistrust is well-founded: The inherent expedience in the above answer is stunning and clearly did not see, or like to think, that what shape these parties/friends might take a few years down the lane. The fall out of this policy certainly proves that Washington’s policy was misplaced and ill-conceived. The mistrust that ensued since the US sanctions on Pakistan is all pervasive even today, something that Hilary Clinton also discerned during her late October 2009 Pakistan visit. Clinton’s candid “admission of guilt” largely went unnoticed in the flood of information revolving around America’s current involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. This also merits a look-back in to how the American empire has kept expanding its influence, imposing its will on nations and countries it considers crucial to its own interests. Sad but true but this sense, nevertheless, is going to fade away soon.

Originally Published at CRSS Pakistan